The decision to share resources is fundamental for cohesive societies. Humans can be motivated to give for many reasons. Some generosity incurs a definite cost, with no extrinsic reward to the act, but instead provides intrinsic satisfaction (labelled here as 'altruistic' giving). Other giving behaviours are done with the prospect of improving one's own situation via reciprocity, reputation, or public good (labelled here as 'strategic' giving). These contexts differ in the source, certainty, and timing of rewards as well as the inferences made about others' mental states. We executed a combined statistical map and coordinate-based fMRI meta-analysis of decisions to give (36 studies, 1150 participants). Methods included a novel approach for accommodating variable signal dropout between studies in meta-analysis. Results reveal consistent, cross-paradigm neural correlates of each decision type, commonalities, and informative differences. Relative to being selfish, altruistic and strategic giving activate overlapping reward networks. However, strategic decisions showed greater activity in striatal regions than altruistic choices. Altruistic giving, more than strategic, activated subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC). Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is consistently involved during generous decisions and processing across a posterior to anterior axis differentiates the altruistic/strategic context. Posterior vmPFC was preferentially recruited during altruistic decisions. Regions of the 'social brain' showed distinct patterns of activity between choice types, reflecting the different use of theory of mind in the two contexts. We provide the consistent neural correlates of decisions to give, and show that many will depend on the source of incentives.
Introduction
The decision to share resources is a cornerstone of any cooperative society. The motivations that drive these choices, however, will vary. Giving can be driven by intrinsic rewards, such as conditioned satisfaction from performing a generous act or the image of oneself as a 'good person'. On the other hand, giving can also be driven by strategic forethought of extrinsic rewards that might be gained through reciprocity, avoidance of punishment, or a public good. Some may argue that 'why' we give does not matter, as long as we do. However, understanding the 'why' is essential for determining the likelihood of prosocial behaviour in the absence of extrinsic benefit, such as when the beneficiary could never return the favour or when societies, which depend on prosocial behaviour, do not provide defined incentives. It can also help us understand how intrinsic and extrinsic drives interact in the decision process.
Over a decade of innovative neuroimaging studies have provided a fresh window into the old problem of why we give. Through this lens, we can see whether different motivations to help one another use different neural (and therefore cognitive) mechanisms. This then provides the basis for studying how these neurocognitive mechanisms may vary independently between contexts and individuals. This insight could also help to explain other phenomena. For instance, overlapping anatomy of intrinsic and extrinsic drives could underpin the effect of extrinsic incentives 'crowding out' altruistic motivations (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) , or make clear how intrinsic and extrinsic benefits sum in strategic decisions to help each other.
However, no systematic meta-analysis has examined the consistency of these findings on prosocial decision-making (see Filkowski et al., 2016 and Luo, 2018 for descriptive reviews, Gabay et al., 2014 for neuroimaging meta-analysis of ultimatum game responders and Bellucci et al., 2017 for trust games). With this meta-analysis, we investigated the consistent neural correlates of decisions to give and differences in these correlates that depend on whether there is potential for extrinsic gain through the interaction.
We define altruistic choices to give as generous acts with no opportunity to gain extrinsic rewards as a direct result of that interaction. Motivations for giving in these contexts rely on intrinsic rewards. Sources of intrinsic reward or 'warm glow' (Andreoni, 1990 (Andreoni, , 1989 can include vicarious reward experience (Mobbs et al., 2009 ); relief of empathic concern (FeldmanHall et al., 2015) ; self-enhancement from adherence to moral codes or social norms (Niemi et al., 2017) ; and conditioned reinforcement (e.g. from parental feedback). Warm glow could also result from inferences of enhanced reputation (Izuma et al., 2010) in the eyes of an experimenter or omniscient religious figure, despite no defined benefit of that enhanced reputation. Intrinsic incentives to give are often studied with dictator games (Kahneman et al., 1986) , donations to charities, or payments to prevent others from coming to harm (Table 1) .
We define strategic choices to give as generous acts that might increase the probability of a defined extrinsic reward. Strategic choices can involve the intrinsic rewards of altruistic choices (Capraro, 2017) , but add the possibility of extrinsic gain, which is thought to be the dominant weight in the decision process (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) . Extrinsic benefits could come through avoiding punishment ; reciprocity of the recipient (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; ; collective contributions to a public good (Chaudhuri, 2011) ; enhanced gains from cooperation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) or rewards from defined future interactions through having an enhanced reputation (Milinski et al., 2001; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005) . Paradigms used to study strategic giving (Table 1) include the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) ; trust game (Berg et al., 1995) ; public goods game (Rapoport, 1987) ; prisoners' dilemma (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) ; and repeated versions of these games which include opportunities for reputation building.
For altruistic choices, goal-attainment based on most intrinsic incentives begins at the time of the action, without delay. As a result, most intrinsic rewards are relatively certain. Warm glow can be modulated, in part, by the gift's (delayed and uncertain) impact on the recipient, but for most paradigms (all those included here), the participant does not observe this impact. Strategic rewards, on the other hand, are weighted to the uncertain effects of the gift on extrinsic outcomes. In these cases, goal attainment comes after the action, when others respond. Keeping money (which we label 'selfish', as opposed to being 'prosocial' by giving, cooperating, or trusting) in a strategic context enhances certainty and immediacy of reward, but could also lead to less money. In the altruistic context, a selfish choice does not change outcome certainty to the same degree, and will always leave the participant with more money.
The use of theory of mind -inferring others' mental states (Frith and Frith, 2006) , also differs between altruistic and strategic decisions to give. In altruistic contexts, theory of mind is likely to be more weighted on how another will feel, rather than what they will do, considering appreciation, change of emotion, or disappointment of the other. This could occur via empathy processes (Lockwood et al., 2015) -feeling what the other is feeling (Decety et al., 2015) , mentalising, or both, with variability across different people (Tusche et al., 2016) . Assuming the inferred appreciation of a gift by the recipient would increase motivation to give, greater theory of mind is expected during altruistic decisions to give, relative to keeping the goods. Strategic decisions might balance that difference to a degree. Intention inferences can motivate either generous or selfish choices and therefore be equally associated with selfish and generous decisions.
In sum, both altruistic and strategic choices incur immediate costs that benefit others but differ in the sources, certainty, and immediacy of the associated reward. Theory of mind is likely to contribute to both decision types, but differently in each, with different dissociations between the prosocial and the selfish choice alternatives, see Fig. 1 .
Two previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, which compared prosocial decisions in the altruistic dictator game with the strategic ultimatum game, report inconsistent findings and interpretations (Weiland et al., 2012; Zheng and Zhu, 2013) . There was qualitatively no overlap of activation between them, creating concerns for the consistency and generalisability of reported differences. A third fMRI study using both ultimatum and dictator games to study childhood development of strategic social behaviour did not focus on the contrast between generous and selfish choices, but interestingly the difference in gift sizes between the two games (Steinbeis et al., 2012 ).
An fMRI meta-analysis integrates prior findings to increase the statistical power to detect reliable, consistent neural correlates of decision types (Müller et al., 2018; Wager et al., 2009 Wager et al., , 2007 . This is vital given that many fMRI reports are based on small sample sizes (Button et al., 2013; Cremers et al., 2017) and do not meet the new standards of high statistical thresholds recently shown to be required for confidence in effects (Eklund et al., 2016) . In addition to the advantages associated with coordinate-based meta-analysis, our use of unthresholded maps enhances sensitivity ) and reduces assumptions of the spatial extent of activations. Our meta-analysis also allows new combinations and contrasts between different task types.
In this study, we do not make firm predictions of specific neural regions, remaining agnostic to previous findings as much as possible with a data-driven approach. One area that was identified as a region of interest a priori, however, was the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), as it is has been reliably linked to subjective value and decision-making (Bartra et al., 2013; Levy and Glimcher, 2012) including prosocial choices (Hare et al., 2010) . It is also a large, cytoarchitecturally heterogeneous region (Mackey and Petrides, 2010) with varying connectivity (Sepulcre et al., 2010) and different sources of value show different activity patterns across it (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2016; Sescousse et al., 2013) . We therefore looked at activation across this region in more detail than the rest of the brain.
The present meta-analysis aims to answer four basic questions across the whole brain, with added focus on vmPFC: i) What is common to altruistic and strategic decisions to give? ii) What is consistent about altruistic decisions? iii) What is consistent about strategic decisions? iv) How do altruistic and strategic decisions differ?
There are examples of real-world decisions that do not fit into our 
Strategic
Trust game Participant transfers an amount of money to the trustee that is multiplied by some factor (often 3). The trustee then chooses an amount to send back which decides the payoff for both players.
Prisoner's dilemma Participant and partner decide whether to cooperate or defect. They gain mutual benefit if both cooperate but individuals gain more by defecting if the partner cooperates.

Public goods game
Participants invest an amount in a communal fund that is then multiplied and divided among all players, including those who did not initially contribute to the communal fund.
Strategic defined groups, such as tax deductions from charitable giving or defined payments for blood donation. We also do not cover outcomes of decisions such learning a person appreciated a gift or rewards associated with choosing a winning strategy. The scope of this meta-analysis is fMRI paradigms for which the data at the point of a decision is available. By better understanding the neural basis of altruistic and strategic decisions as defined here, we provide a foundation for investigations in other contexts, as well as a milestone for research over the last fifteen years.
Method
Literature search and study selection
Literature searches using PubMed and Web of Science identified research added before September 2016. Keywords were either "fMRI" or "neur*" as well as one of: "altruis*", "charity", "charitable", "prosocial", "cooperation", "public goods", "social value orientation", "reputation", "dictator", "ultimatum", "trust game", "prisoner*". We identified additional potential articles from reference lists of selected articles or those offered by authors (Fig. 2 ). Articles were considered if they reported novel fMRI data, not reported elsewhere, collected while participants made decisions, and analysed whole-brain data. For studies that either used psychopharmacological manipulations or tested populations other than healthy participants, we requested data from just the control group.
In addition, studies were screened for eligibility for the two groupings. Decisions in the altruistic group were defined as decisions that benefitted at least one other person at a cost to the self, with no potential for an extrinsic benefit. Paradigms were dictator games, pain vs. gain or donation tasks. Decisions in the strategic group benefitted at least one other person but could also benefit the decision-maker. Common paradigms included trust and ultimatum games. Almost all selected studies focused on deciders rather than responders in these games. Responders, who may be prosocial due to reciprocity norms, have been studied previously (Gabay et al., 2014) . One study (Garbarini et al., 2014) only had data from the responder role in a trust game but with a clear incentive for participants to build up a prosocial and trustworthy reputation in order to receive future investments. All participants thought partners were human, which was true in some cases but not others. For all studies, the data were from the decision phase of the task.
Overall, we identified 35 altruistic and 45 strategic fMRI studies and requested statistical maps from the authors. Due to substantial methodological variation across studies, letters requested the decision of interest contrasted with as many as possible of a high-level control, baseline of some kind and the selfish choice. Obtaining multiple maps for a study maximised the likelihood of similarities between studies and shows whether specific contrasts affected results. If maps were not available, we requested coordinates for contrasts of interests or extracted them from manuscripts. Of these, a coordinate-based analysis was available for eight studies, while others did not report the required contrasts in manuscripts.
Of 35 altruistic studies, 18 authors provided usable maps (51% response rate) and three had coordinates, resulting in data from 557 participants in this group. Of 45 strategic studies, 10 authors provided maps (22%) and five had coordinates, giving data from 593 participants in this group. (See Table 2 ).
Analysis
A combined image and coordinate-based meta-analysis of retrieved data was conducted using Anisotropic Effect Size Signed Differential Mapping software (AES:SDM, Version 4.31; Radua et al., 2014) . When available, statistical maps enhance the sensitivity of the analysis and allow incorporation of both positive and negative differences. With coordinates, the software recreates estimated statistical maps from coordinates and their effect sizes using an anisotropic kernel. If the contrast of interest was available in both directions (e.g. cooperate > defect and defect > cooperate), the opposite peaks became negative t-values. The incorporation of study sample size increases the weight of larger studies.
A random-effects model, using the recommended 50 permutations, implemented all maps. This creates 50 random models with the same number of foci as the map of interest and tests the null hypothesis that the map's activations are the result of random distribution throughout the brain. Thresholding parameters used were those recommended by who found a voxel-level threshold of p < 0.005 to approximate p < 0.05 corrected and optimally balance specificity and sensitivity. Reported z-scores are specified as SDM-Z as they do not follow a standard normal distribution.
Contrasts and covariate
The available datasets used a range of control conditions broadly classified as rest (including one-sample tests), visuomotor controls, or selfish decisions. These controls vary significantly across multiple processes so we used an overall covariate in our models that codes for comparator complexity to control for differences, rating control conditions from 1 to 4 (see Supplementary Materials S1.2. for details).
For separate analyses of altruistic and strategic decisions, variance attributed to complexity was used to model contrasts between prosocial (generous) decisions and rest (a contrast where the covariate is at its modelled minimum) and between prosocial and selfish decisions (where the effect of the covariate is at its modelled maximum). By including the Fig. 1 . Theoretical presence in altruistic and strategic decisions to give compared to a selfish choice and to rest. This can act as a rough roadmap for interpreting neural differences between the two types of decision to give as well as each decision with the common controls used. covariate in the model, we aimed to allow specificity in our interpretations of activity while maintaining statistical power (by including all available data). In addition, we specifically contrasted prosocial choices to the selfish alternative, only in the studies that had this comparison. This enabled tests of robustness that require a relatively homogenous group (see Supplementary Materials S1.3. for details and S2.1.1. for results).
We used SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, http://www.fil.ion. ucl.ac.uk/spm) to extract areas of overlapping activation common to altruistic and strategic decisions, for example areas significant in both the altruistic > selfish and strategic > selfish maps. These maps were those from the overall analyses described above which use the comparator complexity covariate to model contrasts with rest and selfish decisions while incorporating all studies.
Differences between the decision types were calculated in both directions (altruistic > strategic and strategic > altruistic) using linear models in AES:SDM. For these comparisons, we entered comparator complexity as a covariate of no interest. Comparisons and overlap were also tested in the subgroup of studies with a selfish control. 
Labels and atlases
As AES:SDM uses a white matter template for labels, these were converted to grey matter labels with the Harvard-Oxford atlas in FSL (FMRIB Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). We also labelled regions according to labels used in relevant literature. The temporoparietal junction (TPJ), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) and dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC) coordinates were used from the a priori regions of interest constructed by Telzer et al. (2011) . However, we refer to their medial PFC here as the vmPFC and extend this region further ventral and posterior compared to the boundaries of that paper for our ROIs (see below). We also used connectivity-based parcellation atlases in FSL for further subdivision of the dorsal PFC (Sallet et al., 2013) and medial PFC and cingulate (Neubert et al., 2015) .
ROI analysis
To test the prediction that different types of prosocial decision may show different patterns of activation across the heterogenous vmPFC, values were extracted from across an anatomical axis. These regions were defined a priori by spheres used previously (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2016) and similar to methods used in recent studies (De Martino et al., 2017; Nicolle et al., 2012; Sul et al., 2015; Yankouskaya et al., 2017) . Effect sizes were extracted from single voxels along the same axis for our analysis (see details in Supplementary Materials S1.4. & Fig. 8 ).
Accounting for dropout
A key region of interest, the vmPFC, is known to suffer from distortion and dropout during fMRI scanning due to factors including proximity to air and bone around the sinuses (Ojemann et al., 1997) . While techniques have been developed to minimise this (Weiskopf et al., 2007) they are not universally employed and the inclusion of older studies in the meta-analysis meant that the coverage needed to be examined. This was done by binarising each map, after registration to a common template, based on whether there was signal in each voxel or not and summing these images to create coverage maps (Fig. 3) .
These maps show a decline in coverage around the anterior and inferior edge of the vmPFC, particularly for altruistic studies. With missing data represented as values of 0, this lack of coverage risked false negatives in reported results. To overcome this, we ran an adjusted analysis by modifying the calculations run by AES:SDM using SPM12 to only include studies with data present, on a voxel by voxel basis (see details in Supplementary Materials S1.5.). We did this only on the subgroup of studies with a contrast with selfish decisions.
Results
Mean analyses
Altruistic
Compared to being selfish, making a prosocial choice in an altruistic context showed significant activation in nucleus accumbens (NuAcc), subgenual (subcallosal) area of the anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), vmPFC, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), left dlPFC (Sallet et al., 2013 area 8B) , pre-supplementary motor areas (pre-SMA), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and right cerebellum. Regions showing greater activation during selfish than altruistic decisions included bilateral dlPFC (areas 46 & 9), bilateral putamen, right caudate nucleus, bilateral posterior STS, bilateral frontal poles, and left amygdala ( Fig. 4a & Table 3 ).
Comparisons to 'rest' tell us how the brain is responding generally, in the decision context. These maps can be useful for making future predictions, but also aid the interpretation of the other contrasts. For instance, a region being 'more active' in one condition compared to another may counterintuitively actually reflect relatively less deactivation in that condition, relative to a common baseline.
Altruistic decisions contrasted with rest showed significant activation in ACC (Neubert et al., 2015 area 8m) , right anterior insula (AI), bilateral dlPFC (area 46 V), SMA and occipital cortex. Areas less active during the decision were vmPFC extending into left dmPFC, posterior insula, left precuneus, separate dlPFC regions (areas 8B & 46D), bilateral vlPFC, and temporal sulci, including TPJ and the pSTS in both hemispheres (Fig. 4b  & Supplementary Table 1) .
Strategic
Strategic prosocial decisions, compared to selfish decisions, related to significantly higher activation in bilateral NuAcc, sgACC, vmPFC, ACC, right precuneus, right amygdala and regions of the cerebellum. Selfish strategic choices related to more activity in left TPJ, anterior middle temporal regions, right temporal pole and pre and postcentral gyri ( Fig. 5a & Table 4 ).
Compared to rest, strategic prosocial choices evoked similar results to altruistic prosocial choices in the equivalent analysis: activation in ACC (area 8m), bilateral AI, widespread bilateral dlPFC regions, SMA and occipital cortex. In addition, strategic decisions showed activation in bilateral putamen and the right caudate. Deactivation was across vmPFC, left dmPFC, bilateral posterior insula, bilateral precuneus, left dlPFC (area 8B), left vlPFC, bilateral TPJ and posterior & anterior STS regions ( Fig. 5b & Supplementary Table 2 ).
Overlap
Overlaps were analysed using SPM to identify regions significant in both altruistic and strategic maps for a given contrast. These maps use the complexity covariate to model contrasts with rest and selfish decisions while incorporating all studies.
Compared to the selfish alternative, both types of prosocial choice showed overlapping activity in left NuAcc, ACC (sgACC and area 32), vmPFC and right OFC (Fig. 6a) . There was no overlap of areas responding more to the selfish choice (selfish > prosocial).
When contrasted with rest, altruistic and strategic decisions both activated bilateral ACC (area 8m), right AI, bilateral thalamus, bilateral SMA, pre-SMA, bilateral occipital and parietal cortices. Altruistic and strategic decisions showed overlapping deactivations in vmPFC, right temporal pole, left precuneus, left dlPFC (area 8B), right posterior insula, left OFC and bilateral TPJ & posterior STS (Fig. 6b) .
Comparison
Areas more active during altruistic prosocial choices than strategic prosocial choices were the sgACC, left TPJ, left anterior STS, left inferior frontal gyrus, right temporal pole, right inferior temporal gyrus and bilateral thalamus. Strategic prosocial choices, compared to altruistic Differences between prosocials and proselfs in structure and function Prisoner's dilemma with measures of SVO Note. tN ¼ total sample in study, N ¼ sample used in analysis, F ¼ number of female participants as a fraction of tN or N depending on information provided, T ¼ field strength of scanner in tesla, FWHM ¼ full width half maximum size of smoothing kernel, sig ¼ significance threshold used in study (this is relevant for studies with peaks but provided for those with maps to show peak thresholds are in line with other research), U ¼ uncorrected for multiple comparisons, C ¼ corrected for multiple comparisons, FWE ¼ with family-wise error correction, FDR ¼ with false discovery rate correction, PM ¼ parametric modulation. Control: R ¼ rest (including one sample t-tests), V ¼ visuomotor control, S ¼ selfish decision (including parametric modulation by generosity), Code ¼ code for complexity of the control condition from 1 (minimum) to 4 (maximum).
prosocial choices, showed more activity in the right NuAcc, left caudate, right dlPFC (area 46D), right posterior STS and right frontal pole ( Fig. 7 & Table 5 ).
ROI analysis
Previous findings have shown that trajectories across the vmPFC can delineate decision types. Values were examined at the same 20 y and z coordinates (see Supplementary Figure 1 ) for x ¼ 0, x ¼ 4 and x ¼ À4. Results reported here are from x ¼ 4 as this plane showed the most striking differentiation but results for x ¼ 0 and x ¼ À4 were similar (see Supplementary Materials S2.2. and Supplementary Figure 5) .
We ran linear models on each study's extracted effect sizes for each voxel using (i) all the data, including zero values and (ii) only the studies with data in that voxel, on a voxel-by-voxel basis. In both cases, a mixedeffects model was a better fit than a fixed-effects model. Both analyses revealed an interaction between vmPFC voxel location and decision group, (i) t (22) ¼ 3.11, p ¼ 0.005; (ii) t (21.1) ¼ 3.31, p ¼ 0.003. Altruistic activation was greatest in posterior vmPFC, as suggested by the whole brain results, and decreased moving anterior, whilst strategic activation increased along this axis (Fig. 8) .
Adjustment for dropout
As predicted, the analysis adjusting for missing data (see Supplementary Materials S1.5. for details) showed increased effect sizes across the lower vmPFC where dropout was most severe (Fig. 3) . Activations based on SDM-Z > 2.3 uncorrected were larger in the adjusted than the original analysis for the altruistic mean activations (Fig. 9a) . This threshold was chosen as a common value for thresholding, close to the average of the critical SDM-Z values generated in the permutation tests for the original analyses and AES:SDM analyses run with the 50% of maps Fig. 8 . vmPFC ROI analysis: average effect sizes of activation for each group for each voxel at x ¼ 4, not including studies with no data in that voxel (see Supplementary Fig. 1 for exact location of voxels and Supplementary Fig. 5 for graphs including all data). Error bars depict within-study standard error. with the best coverage. For the comparison where altruistic > strategic prosocial choices, posterior vmPFC activations were either larger than the original analysis or shown only in the adjusted analysis (Fig. 9b) . In the original comparison where strategic > altruistic prosocial choices, no vmPFC activation was significant when thresholded using AES:SDM permutation analysis and very little showed SDM-Z > 2.3. However, when adjusting for dropout, a small region of activation in anterior vmPFC shows SDM-Z scores greater than 2.3 (Fig. 9b) .
Discussion
This meta-analysis shows there is consistency in neural processes during decisions to give, using over a decade of fMRI research and over one thousand participants. Within each type of decision to give (altruistic and strategic), activations are present across a variety of tasks, suggesting common core processes. There are also differences between the two types of decisions to give, which are thought to reflect the differences in the source of reward, timing, certainty, and application of theory of mind.
We structure our discussion around the basic questions for the metaanalysis, though some discussion of contrasts inevitably crosses into more than one section. We focus on established social cognition and reward networks, given these are the most common networks discussed in the independent studies, but also highlight activations outside of this familiar territory.
All group-level thresholded and unthresholded statistical brain maps are available on NeuroVault (Gorgolewski et al., 2015) : https:// neurovault.org/collections/3987 and details of peaks (as well as maps) can be downloaded from https://doi.org/10.25377/sussex.c.4155923. Since a discussion of each individual activation is not feasible in this discussion, we encourage the reader to use these maps, together with provided tables, for their reference, inference, and convenience in future research.
What is common to altruistic and strategic decisions to give?
Sharing with others in either context consistently activates regions associated with reward. Compared to selfish decisions, NuAcc, vmPFC, OFC sgACC and ACC (area 32) are more active when an individual decides to give. These regions are established elements of the reward and value-computation networks (Bartra et al., 2013) . A NuAcc activation, for instance, gives a moderately strong likelihood that a reward process is occurring (Ariely and Berns, 2010) and responds to multiple reward types (Levy and Glimcher, 2012) including money, intrinsic reward (Genevsky et al., 2013; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2006) and strategic cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002) .
These signals may represent different concepts in the two contexts. While intrinsic reward may accompany strategic prosocial choices, these activations could also signal anticipation of an extrinsic benefit. This would suggest intrinsic altruistic motivation shares neural circuits with extrinsic motivation, supporting the common neural currency proposal (Levy and Glimcher, 2012) for multiple aspects of prosocial decision-making. Speculatively, this overlap may also explain behavioural findings of decreased altruistic behaviour, which was once freely given, following introduction of extrinsic incentives, by 'crowding out' the intrinsic motivations represented within the same neural circuits (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) . Such a conclusion however, would need direct experimentation.
Being selfish, relative to being prosocial, does not overlap much between strategic and altruistic contexts, save for a small region of the parietal operculum when limiting to the selfish subgroup. This suggests the underlying processes and expectations are likely to be different. In altruistic contexts, the contrast may represent a preference for self over others or loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007) . In strategic contexts, the choice is more likely driven by predictions of others' behaviour and the desire to reduce uncertainty. Note. L ¼ left, R ¼ right, BA ¼ Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z ¼ SDM z-value of activation, Vox ¼ number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than one BA, none is reported either by AES:SDM software, or here. Activations are after controlling for the complexity of the control task. All results are from the subgroup of studies with a selfish contrast.
As expected for any contrast with rest, altruistic and strategic generosity show overlapping widespread deactivation of the 'default mode' network and activation of the 'task-activated' network (Fox et al., 2005) . These activations, such as in ACC and AI, could reflect domain-general processes such as deciding between multiple options (Kennerley et al., 2009) . They could also reflect more specific processes common to both contexts, for example negative aspects of the prosocial choice including disutility (Zaki and Mitchell, 2011) , distress (Zanon et al., 2014) , and conflict (Koban et al., 2014) . Finally, these activations could represent different processes in each context. For altruistic giving compared to rest, AI and ACC activity could underlie empathy (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Gospic et al., 2013; Hein et al., 2010) . More relevant for risky strategic giving , ACC activation could reflect greater ambiguity or risk (Krain et al., 2006) or an increase in effort and prediction (Vassena et al., 2017) .
Regions less active than baseline during both types of decision to give include vmPFC, TPJ and STS which are implicated in both social decision-making (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Frith and Frith, 2003; Schurz et al., 2014) and resting-state networks (Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Mak et al., 2017) . This fits with previous demonstrations of quantitative overlap (Acikalin et al., 2017) and discussion on what these processes may share (Mars et al., 2012) . Critically, these effects highlight the importance of the control task when making inferences; the 'activation' associated with a prosocial decision might actually be less deactivation , which only becomes evident with a comparison to rest.
What is consistent about altruistic decisions?
During altruistic decisions, the consistent activation of reward networks demonstrates that despite ending up with less extrinsic gain, the reward system is active when giving.
In addition to regions common to both types of choices to give, generous altruistic decisions compared to selfish choices activate other regions, including left dlPFC (area 8B), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), pre-SMA and right cerebellum. In an analysis restricted to studies with a selfish choice contrast, we also found bilateral precuneus. See below for discussion of these regions.
The reverse contrast identifies additional activation for selfish choices over altruistic ones in putamen, caudate, pSTS, dlPFC (areas 46 & 9), left amygdala and, in the subgroup with selfish contrasts, bilateral posterior insula. The putamen, caudate and amygdalae have all been linked to aspects of reward processing (Haruno and Kawato, 2006; Holland and Gallagher, 2004 ; but see also Miller et al., 2014) and have high levels of interconnectivity (Roy et al., 2009) . These parts of the reward network may be less sensitive to intrinsic rewards and more sensitive to extrinsic benefits of keeping the goods.
There have been claims the dlPFC inhibits selfish tendencies to produce prosocial decisions (Feng et al., 2015; Knoch et al., 2009 Knoch et al., , 2006 Strang et al., 2015) but also findings supporting the reverse, that the inhibition is of prosocial impulses (Christov-Moore et al., 2016; Yamagishi et al., 2016) . Our finding in area 8B corresponds with the former model but our pattern of results for areas 46 and 9 fits with the latter. This anatomical differentiation could explain the differences in previous conclusions if, for example, these stimulation studies targeted different subregions. Other theories (Buckholtz, 2015; Gershman et al., 2014) suggest the lPFC could be integrating norms into decisions -disrupting right lPFC affects adherence to rules in gift-giving contexts (Gross et al., 2018) .
Altogether, these results provide the signature activations of altruistic giving decisions to use in future investigations of their connectivity and more specific roles in prosocial behaviour.
What is consistent about strategic decisions?
During strategic decisions to give, reward circuit activation could represent either extrinsic reward expectancy, which is usually higher for the prosocial choice contingent on the partner's behaviour, or intrinsic satisfaction. The signature of a generous strategic decision also includes activation of precuneus, right amygdala and regions of the cerebellum. Analysis limited to studies with the selfish contrast also shows activity in right dlPFC (area 46), left amygdala and the right frontal pole.
The precuneus shows similar, but not overlapping, activation for both altruistic (bilateral) and strategic (on the left) gifts compared to their selfish alternatives. Along with the PCC being more active for altruistic than selfish decisions, these regions linked to mentalising (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014; Waytz and Mitchell, 2011) , empathy (Jackson et al., 2006) and guilt (Morey et al., 2012) did show results in line with increased perspective taking during prosocial choices.
Activation in the amygdala for strategic decisions fits with our interpretation of reward expectancy during selfishness in altruistic paradigms. In strategic tasks, it could also be interpreted as encoding estimated immediate cost of the gift (Gospic et al., 2013) . Previous studies have shown activity scales with the amount entrusted to another (Stanley et al., 2012) and is greater in real than imagined decisions (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Gospic et al., 2013) . Outside of prosocial decisions, the amygdala is associated with many other relevant processes, including loss aversion (De Martino et al., 2010) , fear (Tovote et al., 2015) , aggression (Haller, 2018) and emotion processing (Janak and Tye, 2015) to name but a few. Due to the low resolution of a meta-analysis from averaging images and the broad scope of the tasks used, this study does not differentiate between specific explanations.
The consistent neural signature of keeping money in strategic contexts includes increased activity in left TPJ, anterior middle temporal regions, right temporal pole and pre and postcentral gyri. The specific analysis with selfish controls also showed activity in bilateral posterior temporal sulci, left temporal pole, left hippocampus, right supplementary motor area, right cerebellum, and right posterior insula. If TPJ and pSTS activations represent mentalising in this context, these results suggest increased processing about the second player is associated with not trusting, valuing, or cooperating with them. For altruistic decisions, this was also the pattern for pSTS.
These findings overall show the consistent pattern of activations during strategic giving for extrinsic rewards. Like for altruistic decisions, future work can use this to reveal the exact roles and connectivity of regions.
How do altruistic and strategic decisions (statistically) differ?
Contrasts between altruistic and strategic choices make a clear case that these groups of tasks rely on different processes and should not be considered interchangeable in the literature.
Altruistic > strategic
Altruistic choices to give correlate with greater activation in a set of reward and social cognition regions. These include sgACC, TPJ and various regions of the temporal lobes. Limiting to selfish contrasts additionally revealed right pSTS. That any regions show greater activity during altruistic choices challenges the idea that strategic decisions encompass all the elements of altruistic decisions.
The sgACC, which is involved in both altruistic and strategic prosocial behaviours independently, is particularly active when only intrinsic motivations are available. This region also activates during charitable donations (Moll et al., 2006) , distinguishes altruism from decisions which benefit the individual (Pulcu et al., 2014) and signals prosocial learning prediction errors (Lockwood et al., 2016) as well as emotional processing in social contexts (Drevets et al., 2008) . Activity in sgACC is also linked to a reduced propensity to harm others in utilitarian judgements (Wiech et al., 2013) . The current meta-analytic finding adds weight to the idea that sgACC, together with a network of social cognition regions, may play a defining role in altruistic decisions to give.
Strategic > altruistic
Strategic decisions correlate with more activity in ventral and dorsal striatum, right dlPFC (areas 46 & 46D), right pSTS and right frontal pole. Isolating studies with a selfish contrast additionally showed posterior insula and fusiform face area activity.
Greater right NuAcc activity for strategic than altruistic choices suggests that intrinsic and extrinsic responses sum in this region, or extrinsic rewards (if supplanting intrinsic rewards) evoke stronger responses. This finding fits with behavioural findings that prosocial choices are more frequent in strategic than altruistic paradigms (Zheng and Zhu, 2013) .
The left caudate also activates more for strategic than altruistic decisions, a pattern previously limited to the putamen (Weiland et al., 2012) . A closer look suggests that differences in dorsal striatum between the task groups may be partly driven by greater activity for the selfish choice in altruistic contexts (a difference absent in strategic contexts). That may be due to the increase in extrinsic reward obtained by being selfish in an altruistic task whereas in strategic scenarios, selfishness often leads to a more certain but lower payment than optimum cooperation. The dorsal striatum has also been linked to habitual responses (Balleine et al., 2007; Burton et al., 2015; Everitt and Robbins, 2016) which could suggest that selfish decisions in altruistic contexts are more habitual and less goal-directed than strategic decisions to keep resources (and less sensitive to devaluation).
As expected, inferences from mentalising-associated regions are not straightforward. Compared to strategic gifts, altruistic gifts recruit more left TPJ and left anterior STS activity. Overall, when using all studies, strategic activity in right pSTS is greater than altruistic, potentially reflecting greater consideration of others' intentions. However, when limited to comparisons with a selfish choice, the altruistic choice to give shows greater activity in this region. This discrepancy may result from relatively high but similar levels of mentalising activity prior to either response in strategic contexts. In contrast, the differential between gifts and selfish choices is higher in altruistic contexts -gifts likely involve more other-oriented processing than selfish choices (e.g. representing the other's need or appreciation).
Outside of mentalising, previous findings show TPJ activation and connectivity also peak at maximum conflict, near the maximum one is willing to give and when temptation to be selfish is greatest (Morishima et al., 2012; Strombach et al., 2015) . This conflict is likely to be highest in an altruistic context, when there is no opportunity for financial gain. Overall, these social brain regions may have different roles which are recruited to varying extents depending on the context of task and what control is used. More work is required to understand precisely what they are doing in each context.
The greater activation for strategic decisions in right dlPFC areas 46 and 46D are in line with findings that levels of strategic behaviour correlate with differences between ultimatum and dictator game activation and cortical thickness (on the left) in dlPFC (Steinbeis et al., 2012) . Moreover, right dlPFC transcranial direct current stimulation had opposing effects on giving behaviour under altruistic and strategic conditions (Ruff et al., 2013) , suggesting the exact role of the region depends on the context.
The vmPFC
Analysis across a ROI axis in the vmPFC, particularly when adjusted for signal dropout, suggests altruistic activation declines moving anteriorly in the brain as strategic activation increases. Along the same axis, regions of vmPFC show differing connectivity patterns (Gallardo et al., 2017) : posterior areas connect locally and to limbic regions while anterior areas are grouped with distant mentalising regions (Alcal a-L opez et al., 2017). Anterior areas are also directly involved in mentalising under conditions of ambiguity, a key feature of strategic tasks (Jenkins and Mitchell, 2010) . A similar axis identifies the influence of certain social inferences on value judgements (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2016; De Martino et al., 2017) . Contrasts of this meta-analysis reflect within-participant comparisons. Looking between participants, selfish and prosocial individuals also differentially activate a similar vmPFC axis during consideration of benefits to the self and benefits to others (Sul et al., 2015) .
With relevance to the nature of reward, previous meta-analyses have suggested concrete primary (food or erotic) and abstract secondary (monetary) rewards are represented more posterior and anterior respectively (Clithero and Rangel, 2013; Sescousse et al., 2013) . By this, increased strategic activation further forward in vmPFC could be interpreted as a reflection of secondary (primarily monetary) rewards, whereas altruistic warm glow may activate areas similar to primary rewards.
There are also other differences between altruistic and strategic decisions, such as the certainty and timing of available rewards that may underlie differences this trajectory, requiring further study to rule these in or out as explanations.
Methodological contributions
We developed a novel method to adjust for dropout when combining effect sizes in a random-effects model that may be useful in future metaanalyses. Code and resources for this adjusted method are available at https://doi.org/10.25377/sussex.c.4223411. Results suggest the role of vmPFC in prosocial decision-making may be underestimated due to a lack of coverage in the region. Future fMRI studies on this topic should always utilise methods to minimise this problem (Domsch et al., 2013; Fernandez et al., 2017; Weiskopf et al., 2007) and report the coverage of the region if focusing on the vmPFC.
This study also highlights the importance of a comparison to a selfish control for interpretation of findings. Generous and selfish choices in strategic tasks similarly involve mentalising and extrinsic rewards, making them more similar than altruistic gifts and their selfish alternatives. The latter put extrinsic and intrinsic motivations in direct competition. This point may explain discrepancies between the two previous studies comparing altruistic dictator and strategic ultimatum games (Weiland et al., 2012; Zheng and Zhu, 2013 ).
Limitations
Applying fMRI meta-analysis to prosocial decisions identifies consistent activations across studies, tasks and controls. However, averaging ignores connectivity (Hein et al., 2016) and individual differences such as social value orientation (Emonds et al., 2014 (Emonds et al., , 2011 Fermin et al., 2016) , attachment style (Schneider-Hassloff et al., 2015) , age (Fett et al., 2014) , gender (Krach et al., 2009 ) and personality (Garbarini et al., 2014) . This paper includes the decisions of 1150 participants but there are more published studies than had maps or coordinates available for analysis.
Even if all published papers on prosocial decisions had been included, conclusions would be limited to specific experimental settings. The separation between altruistic and strategic decisions which arises from tightly controlled games is only an abstraction of real-world decisions. The real world provides opportunities for strategic and altruistic motivations to work together (e.g. picking the ideal present, effective altruism and others) that neuroimaging studies are now only beginning to explore. Moreover, the lab differs from the real world in other respects. For instance, is difficult to measure reputational motivation in lab-based altruistic studies. There is no way to completely prevent the participant considering the experimenter's view of them or their decisions so reputational concerns may differ from real-world donation contexts.
The selfish choice was the most common control condition used in the data we received. However, some research suggests that the contrast of prosocial with selfish choices can be complicated to interpret and can be influenced by context (Krajbich et al., 2015) . The vmPFC region identified in this meta-analysis has been linked to the overall value of a prosocial decision and therefore how long it takes to make (Hutcherson et al., 2015) . It was not possible to incorporate response time into the present analysis, due to under -reporting of reaction times and reliance on group averages.
This meta-analysis also grouped different paradigms together under themes (i.e. multiple economic games). To precisely control for and differentiate the effects unique to individual paradigms would require tightly controlled individual studies or many times the number of available studies.
Conclusion
This study is the first systematic fMRI meta-analysis to demonstrate the consistency and differentiation of neural correlates for strategic and altruistic prosocial decisions. We identify the locations of reliable activations for two different types of prosocial choice.
While we knew both types of gift benefit others, we show that both are also consistently rewarding to the giver and share many neural substrates. In contrast, mechanisms for the decision not to give appears to vary, depending on the strategic context.
Despite some similarities, altruistic and strategic decisions to give are not interchangeable in the brain. The potential for an extrinsic benefit changes the neural mechanism at the point of choice in both level and location of activation. Of the regions involved in prosocial choices overall, sgACC activated more for altruistic than strategic decisions and NuAcc was more active for strategic than altruistic choices. That any region is more involved in altruistic decisions suggests that there is something additive and special about giving when the only benefit is a warm glow. Greater reward-network activity for strategic decisions is in line with, and may account for, higher rates of prosocial choices in these contexts, compared to altruistic ones.
Across regions linked to social cognition, results were mixed, reflecting the complexity and diversity of theory of mind application in our social lives.
The changing cytoarchitecture across the vmPFC also differentiates strategic and altruistic gifts. Activity increased for strategic and decreased for altruistic choices along a posterior to anterior axis in a way that relates well to what we know about the connectivity and functions across this region.
Methodologically, we provide an additional step forward in the methods of meta-analyses to account for variable signal dropout between fMRI studies.
With consistent effects in hand, the field can move forward with focused examination to distinguish between competing interpretations of each region's role in prosocial decision-making. 
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